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II

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(3)(j) and (4) and
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-1 03(2)(j)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment to Jim
and Melodie Imus based upon the doctrine of boundary by estoppel?
Issue: Can the trial court's grant of summary judgment be sustained based upon
the doctrine of boundary by agreement?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary Judgment
A trial court's conclusions of law in granting summary judgment are generally
reviewed by an appellate court for correctness. However, as discussed more fully below,
a trial court's rcsolution ofthc mixcd qucstion of law and

l~lct

prescntcd by a claim lor

equitablc cstoppel is cntitled to dclcrcnce on appeaL and will be upheld abscnt an abuse
of discretion.
Equitable Estoppel
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that "while we generally consider de novo
a trial court's statement of the legal rule, we often review with far less rigor the court's
determination of the legal consequences of facts." Siale v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah
1994), This is because "with regard to many mixed questions of fact and law, it is either
not possible or not wise for an appellate court to define strictly how a legal concept is to
be applied to each new set of facts" and in such cases "overinvolvement by an appellate

court can lead to confusing and inconsistent pronouncements of the law." State v. Levin,
2006 UT 50, '122, 144 P.3d 1096. Accordingly, in cases involving mixed questions of
law and fact, the appellate courts wish to leave a trial court free "to reach one of several
possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of facts without risking
reversal." [d. In order to guide the appellate courts in determining the proper level of
delcrence to afford a trial court's resolution of mixed questions of law and fact. in Pena
thc Utah Supreme Court developed a four-part test.]
Applying the Pena test to equitable estoppel, the Utah Supreme Court has held that
the "issue of whether equitable estoppel has been proven is a classic mixed question of
fact and law," applicable "to a wide variety of factual and legal situations," which
"weighs heavily against lightly substituting our judgment for that of the trial court.'- State

Dep" ajI/uman Services ex ref Parker v. irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997).
Accordingly, on appeal the court will "properly grant the trial court's decision a fair
degree of deference when we review the mixed question of whether the requirements of
the law of estoppel have been satisfied in any given factual situation." id. Affording
such deference, "an appellate court will not overturn the trial court's application 01'
equitable estoppel absent an abuse of discretion." State Dep'1. ofHuman Services ex ref.

] As refined by the court in Siale v. Levin, 2006 UT 50,144 P.3d 1096 this test includes
following elements: (1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the
legal rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's application of the legal
rule relies on "facts" observed by the trial judge, "such as a witness's appearance and
demeanor, relevant to the application of thc law that cannot be adcquatcly rcflected in the
record available to appellate courts;" and (3) other policy reasons that weigh [or or against
granting discretion to trial courts.
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Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997); Dahllnv. Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App
391,101 P.3d 830.
Whether the facts to which the trial court applies the law are contestcd and
rcsolved following trial or are uncontested and submitted through written plcadings on
summary judgment does not change this standard. While the reviewing court will Gust
like the trial court) view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the
court will nevertheless afford deference to the trial court's application of the law to those
facts, and will not substitute its judgmcnt for that of the trial court absent an "abusc of
discretion." This is evident fi'OIn numcrous Utah court decisions whcre. notwithstanding
the 111Ct that the opcrative faets wcrc not obtained through trial, dcfcrcncc was
nevertheless afforded to the trial court's resolution of mixed questions of law and fact.
For example, in Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, 12 P.3d 580,
thc trial court dismissed the defendant's unjust enrichment counterclaim based upon facts
stipulated to by the parties. ld. at 582. On appeal, the defendant argucd that thc court
should "review the district court's dismissal of his unjust enrichment counterclaim for
corrcctness, granting no discretion to the district court's application of the law to the facts
in this case because the parties stipulated to the facts." Id. The defendant "maintain[ed]
that because the parties stipulatcd to the facts. the trial court did not 'obscrvc' any facts
that are not prcsented in idcntical form on appcal"' and that as a rcsult. thc "third IPenCl I
factor weighing in favor of granting discretion to thc district court is abscnt, and
therefore, [the court] should grant no discretion to the district court in this case." Id.
The court flatly rejected this argument, explaining that the court's conclusion in

3

Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998) that the Pena factors militated in favor of
broad deference to the trial court's application of the facts to the law of unjust enrichment
was unaffected by the fact that the operative facts were stipulated instead of determined
after trial:
Although the district court did not have the opportunity to "observe" the
stipulated facts, it did have adequate opportunity to become fully
acquainted with the facts. Additionally, the other reasons we described in
Jeffs for granting the trial court broad discretion are still applicable in this
case and weigh in favor of granting discretion to the district court. As we
stated in Jeffs, the facts underlying unjust enrichment claims vary greatly
from case to case, and the doctrine of unjust enrichment was specifically
developed to address situations "that did not fit within a particular legal
standard but which nonetheless merited judicial intervention." id. at 124445. In Jeffs, we also said that an appellate court's ability to clearly articulate
outcome-determinativc factors in unjust enrichment cases "rcmains
elusive," and thus favored granting the trial court broad discretion. Jd. at
1245. Furthermore, we determined that therc wcrc no policy rcasons
outwcighing the factors favoring broad discretion. As in Jeffs, wc will
rcvicw the district court's Icgal findings for correctness, granting it broad
discretion in its application of unjust enrichment law to the stipulated facts.

id.

Utah courts have consistently applied the same reasoning in other cases involving

review of a trial court's resolution of mixed questions of law and fact, including appeals
from a grant of summary judgment

2

2

See John Holmes Canst., inc. v. R.A. McKell Excavating, inc., 2004 UT App. 392, 101

P.3d 833 (reviewing grant of summary judgment and affording "broad discretion to the
trial court in its application of unjust enrichment law to the facts") rev 'd on other grounds
by John Holmes Canst., inc. v. gA. McKell Excavating, inc, 2005 UT 83, 131 P.3d 199;
see also Central Florida investments, {nco v. Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3. 40 P.3d
599 (noting that although "I w jhether a party has waived thc right to arbitratc is a factually
intcnsive determination" because it presents a mixed question oflaw and fact, trial court's
determination of whether right has been waived is cntitled to deference on appeal, even
where no live testimony taken); Smile {nc Asia Pte. LId. v. BriteSmile Management, inc.,
122 P.3d 654 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (same).
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Accordingly, just as in Desert Miriah and numerous other Utah cases, the appellate
court must afford deference to the trial court's determination that equitable estoppel is
proper in this case. Although the trial court did not hear live testimony, the court not only
considered the stipulated and undisputed facts in the light most favorable to the Bahrs, it
also resolved all disputed facts in their favor. Following oral argument, it determined that
the mixed question of law and fact presented by the Imuses' equitable estoppel claim
militated in favor of invoking equitable estoppel.
While this inquiry was necessarily fact-intensive, it is this very characteristic of
adjudication of claims that present mixed questions of law and fact that the Utah Supreme
Court has held justifies deference to the trial court. See Levin, 144 P.3d at 1103
("Discretion is broadest--and the standard of review is most deferential--when the
application of a legal concept is highly fact dependant and variable.,,)3 Accordingly, the
trial court's conclusion that equitable estoppel is proper in this case should not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Plaintiffs brought this action seeking removal of one of the Defendants' trees as a
"nuisance" and claiming that the fence marking the boundary between the Bahrs' property

3

See also Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson,886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

(holding that discretion must be granted to trial court's application of the law of equitable
estoppel to the facts because "the determination of equitable estoppel is 'a highly factdependent question, one that we cannot profitably review de novo in every case because
we cannot hope to work out a coherent statement of the law through a course of such
decisions. "') citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 938; see also Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 678; Desert
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and the Imuses' property was improperly located. By their Complaint. the 8ahrs asserted
claims for trespass, quiet title. private nuisance, slander, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Defendants filed a counterclaim, asserting that the fence at issue in
this litigation has been in place since July of 1983, was built as a boundary fence with the
agreement and help of the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, and has been treated as such by
the Imuses, the Bahrs, and the 8ahrs' predecessors in interest for well over twenty years
prior to the initiation of this litigation. Accordingly, even if there were some discrepancy
between the location of the fence and the legal description contained in the parties'
warranty deeds, title to the disputed parcel of property is properly vested in the Imuses
under thc doctrines of boundary by acquiescence. boundary by agreement and boundary
by estoppel.
Proceedings Below
This action was initiated by the Bahrs on or about April 2, 2004. 8y their
complaint, the Bahrs' asserted claims for private nuisance, slander, intentional infliction
of emotional distress. trespass. and quiet title. (R. 1-12.) Extensive discovery was
undertaken by the Plaintiffs. including the depositions of nearly a dozen of the parties'
neighbors in an attempt to produce evidence in support of their Bahrs' claim for slander
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The lmuses filed for summary judgment
on these and the Bahrs' other claims on or about January 19,2007. (R.215-216.)
By their motion, the Imuses demonstrated that notwithstanding their extensive
discovery. the 8ahrs had not produced any evidence whatsoever in support of their claims

Miriah, 12 P.3d at 582; supra, 1'n. 2.
6

for slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the Bahrs finally stipulated
to dismissal of these claims. Memorandum Decision, dated September 12,2007
("Mem.Dec.") at 3. (R. 1188.) The 1muses further demonstrated that they were entitled to
summary judgment based on the doctrines of Boundary by Estoppel and Boundary by
Agreement. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
(R.457-486.)
After considering the undisputed facts, and construing all disputed facts in the light
most favorable to the Bahrs. the trial court ruled that the Imuses were entitled to
possession of the disputed parcel based upon the doctrine of boundary by estoppel. Order
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs['J Motion
for Summary Judgment and Motion to Compel, dated October 16,2007 ("Order") at 2.
(R. 1194.) Because this ruling disposed of the Bahrs' claims, the court did not rule on the

lmuses' claim lor Boundary by Agrccmcnt. Mcm.Dcc. at 4. (R. 1189.) Thc 13ahrs have
now appcaled this ruling.
{mus' Statemcnt of Undisputcd Facts
1.

On or about March 24, 1983, Jim and Melodee lmus (the "1m uses")

purchased the property located at 2084 E. Buckingham Way, Sandy, Utah. (the "Imus
Property"). See lmus Warranty Deed, Exhibit A to Jim Imus Affidavit. (R. 235.)
2.

In about June of 1983. thc 1muses approach cd their then-ncxt-door-

neighbors to the east, (the "Daltons") and their then-neighbors to the west, Brent and
Brenda Wyman (the "Wymans"), living at 2074 E. Buckingham Way, Sandy, Utah, to
discuss the construction of a fence marking a boundary between their respective
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properties (the "Boundary Fence"). Deposition ofMelodee lmus ("Melodee lmus Ocp.")
at 36:24 - 37 :4, 52: 19 - 53:8 (R. 271-274); Deposition of Jim lmus ("Jim lmus Dcp.") at
30: 18 - 31: 13. (R. 287-288.)
3.

The Wymans indicated that although they could not afford to help pay for

the construction of the Boundary Fence, they would like to have the fence and were
willing to assist in locating and constructing thc 110undary j:ence. Melodcc Imus Dep. at
36:24 - 37:20,54:20-22 (R. 271-273; 275); .lim Imus Oep. at 33: 11-20 (R. 289); Anidavit
of Brenda Wyman ("Brenda Wyman Aff.") at

~

3 (R. 218); Affidavit of Brent Wyman

("Brent Wyman Mf.") at '13 (R. 223.).4
4.

The lmuses and the Wymans thereafter agreed to the location of the

., The Bahrs contend that the affidavit tcstimony of Brent Wyman should be disregarded
becausc an executed copy ofthc affidavit was inadvertently not filcd by the Imuses.
However, "it is axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial court may not be raised
for the first time on appeal." Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659
P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). lfa party opposing summary judgment fails to move to
strike a defective affidavit, "formal or evidentiary defects in [the] affidavit ... are
waived." Pinelree Assocs. v. Ephraim City, 2003 UT 6, '119, 67 P.3d 462, 465; see also
Franklin Financial. 659 !'.2d at 1044 ("rIlf ... an opposing party I~lils to movc to strike
the defective affidavits. hc is deem cd to have waivcd his opposition to whatever
cvidcntiary dcfects may cxist."): /lo\Vick v. Bank o/Sall Lake. 498 j'-2d 352. 353-54
(Utah 1972) ("[ Fjormal defccts arc waivcd in the absence of such a motion or other
objection."). As noted. evcn formal defects in an affidavit are admitted if the opposing
party does not timely object, as shown by Hobelman Motors, Inc., v. Allred, where an
opposing party waived its right to strike an affidavit that was not notarized. 685 P.2d
544,546 (Utah 1984).
Not only did the Bahrs fail to object to Brent Wyman's affidavit or raise any alleged
defect in their memorandum opposing the lmuses' motion for summary judgment, the
Bahrs failed to do so during the many months between the time the lmuses filed their
summary judgment memorandum and oral argument or during oral argument.
Accordingly, the factual contentions regarding Brent Wyman's testimony contained in the
Imuses' memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment must be deemed
admitted by the Bahrs.
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Boundary Fence and worked together to construct the fence. Melodee lmus Dep. at
55:11-19,57:10- 58:13, 60:8-12 (R. 276-279); Jim lmus Dep. at 34:13 -36:10, 37:10-18
(R. 290-292); Brenda Wyman Aff. at '14 (R. 218); Brent Wyman Aff. at '14. (R. 223.)'
5.

Because it was not clear where the actual boundary line was located, at the

time the Boundary Fence was built, the Wymans and the Imuses agreed that the fence
marked the boundary between their respective properties. Melodee lmus Dep. at 55: 1119,57:10- 58:13, 60:8-12 (R. 276-279); Jim lmus Dep. at 34:13 -36:10, 37:10-18 (R.
290-292): Ilrcnda Wyman All. at '15 (R. 218): Brcnt Wyman AlT. at '15. (R. 223.)6
6.

Following the construction of the Boundary Fcnce, the 1m uses and the

Wymans at all times treated the fence as the boundary between their respective properties.

See Affidavit ofMelodee lmus ("Melodee lmus Aff.") at '17 (R. 229); Affidavit of Jim
lmus ("Jim lmus Aff.") at "7 (R. 250); Brenda Wyman Aff. at

~

6 (R. 218); Brent

Wyman Air at '16 (R. 223.) Photographs of the Boundary Fcnce shortly altcr
construction arc attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavits of Melodee and Jim [mus. (R.

The Bahrs did not dispute Fact Nos. 1-4 in opposing the lmuses' Motion for Summary
Judgment and they must accordingly be deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
6 The Bahrs attcmpted to disputc this fact on summary judgment by citing to testimony
indicating that in deciding wherc to build the Boundary l:ence, the lmuses and Wymans
referred to markings on the ground and used tape measures. Howcver, both the lmuses
and thc Wymans have unequivocally testified that although they used existing stakcs and
marking pins to estimate the location of the boundary line betvveen their respective
properties, they were nevertheless uncertain of the precise location of the true boundary
line. Melodee lmus Dep. at 55:11-19, 57:10 - 58:13, 60:8-12 (R. 276-279); Jim lmus
Dep. at 34: 13 - 36: 10, 37: I0-18 (R. 290-292); Brenda Wyman Afr. at ~ 5 (R. 218); Brent
Wyman Aff. at '15. (R. 223.) Accordingly, the trial court correctly held that there is no
genuine dispute regarding this fact.

5
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237-240; 257-260.)7
7.

Within weeks of the construction of the Boundary Fence, the [muses

constructed improvements on their property up to the Boundary Fence. Thcse
improvements included landscaping, irrigation, and storage sheds. Melodee Imus Aff. at
~

8 (R. 229); Jim Imus Aff. at ~ 8 (R.250); Brenda Wyman Aff. at ~ 7 (R.218); Brent

Wyman Mf. at'17. (R.223}
8.

The landscaping installed by the Imuses is elaborate and costly. The Imuses

have a great love of nature, and selected their lot specifically because of the view and the
exposure to sunlight needed for planting. Melodee Imus Aff. at '19 (R.229-230); Jim
1mus Aff. at ~ 9 (R. 250-251.) Over time the Imuses have planted thousands of plants
including annuals, perennials, trees and shrubs, and even installed a high-quality built-in
koi pond, all in an effort to attract birds and create a naturaL secluded environment. Jd
The total estimated costs lor these improvements is in excess of $30,000.00. Jd
Photographs of the [muses' landscaping as it has matured over they years are attached as
Exhibit C to the Affidavits of Jim and Melodee Imus. (R.261-265; 242-246.)
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7 The Bahrs did not dispute this fact in opposing the Imuses' Motion for Summary
Judgment and it must accordingly be deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
~ Although the Bahrs attempted to contest this fact on summary judgment, the deposition
pages they cited simply indicate that there has been and is currently vegetation, bird
feeders, groundcover, etc. on the Disputed Parcel. In fact, Plaintiffs Robert Bahr and
Sherri Bahr specifically testified that they "don't know" whether the Imuses had installed
irrigation prior to the time the Bahrs purchased their property, but they saw the "water
[come] on." Robert Bahr Dep. at 59:22 - 60:4 (R.739); Sherri Bahr Dep. at 115:12-18.
(R.345.) Given the tcstimony of the lmuses, the trial court correctly held that therc is no
genuinc dispute regarding this fact.
9 Melodie Imus testified that while the original cost of the improvemcnts to the Disputed
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9.

In or about 1985, the Wymans sold the 2074 E. Buckingham Way property

to Joe Carlisle. See Warranty Deed attached to the affidavit of Jim Imus as Exhibit I-I.
(R.343.)
10.

At all timcs during Mr. Carlisle's ownership of the 2074 E. Buckingham

Way property, the Imuses and Mr. Carlisle treated the Boundary Fence as the boundary
between their respective properties. Melodee Imus Aff. at
~lll.

~111

(R.230); Jim lmus Aff. at

(R. 251.)
II.

In or about December of 1988, the Bahrs purchased the 2074 E.

Buckingham Way property (the "Bahr Propcrty). The Bahrs' Complaint, at
12.

~16.

(R.2.)

At all times following the Bahrs' purchasc of the 2074 E. Buckingham Way

property, the Imuses and the Bahrs each occupied, maintained, and improved their
respective properties up to, but not over, the Boundary Fence. Melodee lmus Aff. at

~113

(R.230); Jim lmus Aff. at ~ 13. (R. 251.)10
13.

The Bahrs admit that prior to the initiation of this action in March of2004,

thcy ncver took any action to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, or occupying the
property cast of the Boundary Fence. Deposition ofShcrri Bahr ("Sherri Bahr Dep.") at
65:7-12 (R. 350); Deposition of Robert Bahr ("Robert Bahr Dep."), at 26: I0-21. (R.

Parcel was approximately $7000-$9000, the estimated replacement cost of the now
mature landscaping is in excess of $15,000. Second Melodee Imus AiT. at ~14 (R.I 033.).
Accordingly, the trial court properly held that there is no genuine dispute that the Imuses
expended at least $7000 - $9000 improving the Disputed Parcel.
10 On summary judgment, the Bahrs did not dispute Fact Nos.9-12, and they are therefore
deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

II

360.)11
14.

Prior to Scptcmbcr of 2003. thc rclationship bctwccn thc Imuses and the

Bahrs was cordial and friendly, and the parties performed neighborly tasks for each other
like collecting each other's mail while on vacation. ShelTi Bahr Dep. at 125:2-22 (R.
775); Melodee Imus Aff. at ~ 15 (R. 309); Jim Imus Aff. at '115. (R.328.)
15.

In about September 01'2003, the Bahrs complained to the 1muses that they

did not likc thc Russian Olive tree thc Imuses had growing in thcir back yard ncxt to thc
Boundary Fcnce, and requested that the [muses trim or remove the tree. .lim Imus Dep. at
59:19-23 (R. 717); Melodee Imus Dep. at 68:1-9. (R. 686.)
16.

The Imuses gave the Bahrs permission to remove the Russian Olive tree,

and even obtained estimates for the removal of the tree, but the Bahrs declined to remove
thc trec themselves or pay a third party to perform that work . .Iimlmus Dep. at 62: 1463:3 (R.718); Melodee Imus Dep. at 76:17-77:2, 78:10-79:1. (R.688-689.)
17.

As a result of the parties' inability to resolve their dispute over the Russian

Olive tree, their relationship began to deteriorate. Beginning in October of 2003, the

The Bahrs attempted to dispute this fact on summary judgment by asserting that they
complained that the "fence looked off," made complaints to Sandy City in approximatcly
2003, and thereafter obtained a survey. Sherri Bahr Dep. 18:3-19:23, 21: 10-22:3, 26: 1927: 5. 3 I :24-32 :21, 34 :20-3 5: I I, 41: 8-13, 44:7-45 :22, 46:7 -49: 15, 50: 14-5 I :17, 55: 1957:17,57:20-59:21,61:5-10,129:243-130:4 (R. 749-759, 776-777); Robert l3ahr Dep.
16:23-17:9,20:6-21:5,22:5-23:3,34:20-35:16, 66:9-20, 70:2-71:2 (R. 728-730, 733, 741742); lone Senn Dep. 13 :7-15 :6, 18: 19-19: I. (R. 782-784.) However, notwithstanding
these allegations, the Plainti ffs expressly admitted during their depositions that for nearly
15 years after acquiring their property, they never took any action to prevent the Imuses
from using, improving, and occupying the Disputed Parcel. Sherri l3ahr Dep. at 65:7-12
(R. 350); Robert l3ahr Dep. at 26: I 0-21. (R.360.) Accordingly, there can be no genuinc
disputc regarding Fact No. 13.
II
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Bahrs began contacting Sandy City to lodge complaints against the 1muses, including
complaints regarding the proximity of the lmuses' storage sheds to the property line, the
!muses' front yard landscaping, and the !muses' parking of their travel trailer in their
drivcway. Sherri Bahr Dep. at 57:3-7. 57:20-60:20. (R. 758-759.)
18.

Thc Bahrs nOli' contcnd that thcy obtained a survey 01" thc Bahr Propcrty in

ovcmber of 2003 (the "Bahr Survey") which indicates that the disputed Russian Olive
Trce is actually on their property, as the Boundary Fence is improperly located and
deviates from the true property line from a couple of inches at the street in the front of
their home to approximately five feet at the back of the parties' properties, creating a pieshaped parccl that is now in disputc (thc "Disputed Parcel"). The llahrs' Complaint at

'1

29. (R 4-5.)
19.

The Bahrs admit that when they purchased the Bahr Property, the Boundary

Fcncc and the disputed Russian Olive tree were already in place, and that they did not
suspcct or believe that they were purchasing the Disputed Parcel. Indced, Mr. Bahr
speci fically admitted that at the timc he purchased his property hc did not "suspec!l] or
believe[] that [he] was also purchasing the [Disputed Parcel], that he "did not rely on the
decd dcscription" or believe the deed description "was at variance" with the location of
the fence. Robert Bahr Dep. at 32: 23 -33:8; 74:12-22. (R.732, 743.)
20.

Thc Bahrs further admitted that "if it turns out [thc Bahrs'J are now able to

attain"the Disputed Parcel they would bc "getting more than [theYI thoughtltheyj were
getting at the time [they] purchased" their properly. Robert Bahr Dcp, at 33:9-13. (R.
732.)
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21.

Although Sherri Bahr now contends that she "questioned" over the years

whether the Boundary Fence marked the true boundary between the parties' respective
properties, prior to the dispute over the Russian Olive Tree in approximately September
of 2003, the Bahrs took no action to determine whether the Boundary Fence actually
marked the property line. The Bahrs' Complaint at '128 (RA); Sherri Bahr Dep. at 45:16461. (R. 755-756.)
22.

The distance between the Imuses' east boundary fence and the west

Boundary Fence is 80 feet-the same distance indicated on the Imuses' plat map for their
property. See Jim lmus Aff. at

~

20 (R.252); lmus Property Plat Map. (R. 368.) If the

Boundary Fence were moved as the Bahrs request, the Imuses would lose approximately
fivc feet of their property which they likely could not recover from their east neighbor duc
to the long passage of time.
23.

Moving the boundary at this point would not only require the Imuses to

incur significant expense, but would also cause them significant inconvenience, as
irrigation systems would have to be relocated, their storage shed would have to be
rcmovcd altogether. and they would lose virtually all or the irreplaceable mature
landscaping on the west side of their property. Melodee Imus All. at '121-22 (R.231); Jim
Imus Aff. at

~

21-22. (R. 252.) Further, Plaintiffs have expressly testified that unless the

lmuses can somehow manage to move the twenty year-old trees and hundreds of other
large and mature plants in the Disputed Parcel to some other location, they intend to
destroy most orthis landscaping, and that the ability to do so is one of the motives of this
lawsuit. Robert Bahr Oep. at 29:25 -31:16 (R.73 1-732); lone Senn Dep. at 46:13-47:11.
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(R.791.)
24.

Removal of the landscaping in the Disputed Parcel would eliminate the

Imuses' privacy and shade, and destroy the fruits of the Imuses many years of hard work
and long hours devoted to beautifying and improving their landscape. Melodee Imus Aff.
at '122 (R.23 I); Jim Imus Aff. at '122. (R. 252.) Such loss would be virtually impossible
to mitigate at any reasonable cost, as the mature growth on the west side of the lmuscs'
property has taken over 20 years to cultivate, grow, and develop. ld. Photographs of the
Imuses' landscaping as it has matured over the years are attached as Exhibit C to the
Affidavits of.fim and Melodee lmus. (R.237-240; 257-260.)
25.

The Wymans, the original owners of the Bahrs' property, have testified that

they believe that based upon their agreement with the Imuses regarding the Boundary
Fence, it would be inequitable to now quiet title to the Disputed Parcel in the Bahrs or
require removal of the Boundary Fence. Brenda Wyman Aff. at '18 (R. 242); Brent
Wyman All. at'l 8. (R. 223.)
Response to Bahrs' Statement of the Case and Facts
As a general matter, throughout the Bahrs' factual statement, many of their
citations do not support their conclusions. Furthermore, the Bahrs include argument in
their factual statement. Finally, the Bahrs miseharacterize thc evidence by adding
unsupportcd interpretations to several of their factual statemcnts and improperly
construing the facts. Rcgarding certain speci fic factual statements made by the Bahrs in
their appeal brief, the 1muses respond as follows:
Alleged Fact No.5: The deposition testimony cited in support of this alleged fact
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does not support the alleged fact. While Jim lmus testified that Brent Wyman did aid in
measuring and constructing the fence, neither Jim lmus nor Melodee lmus testified that
Brenda Wyman did not participate. Melodee lmus Oep.

33:2~20

(R. 711); 53:9-55:17 (R.

683.) To the contrary, Brenda Wyman testified that "the Imuses and the Wymans ...
worked together to construct the fence." Brenda Wyman Aff. at'14. (R.297.)
Further, Both the Imuses and the Wymans have unequivocally testified that
although they used existing stakes and marking pins to estimate the location of the
boundary line between their respective properties, they were nevertheless uncertain of the
precise location of the true boundary line, and that they accordingly agreed that the
Boundary Fence would mark the boundary line. Melodee lmus Oep. at 55: 11-19, 57: I058:13,60:8-12 (R. 683-684); Jimlmus Oep. at 34:13- 36:10,37:10-18 (R. 711-712);
Ilrcnda Wyman AIr. at

'I

5 (R. 864): I3I'Cnt Wyman All at '15. (R. 869.)

Alleged Fact No.6: Both the Imuses and the Wymans have unequivocally
testitied that although they used existing stakes and marking pins to measure and estimate
the location of the boundary line between their respective properties, they were
nevertheless uncertain of the precise location of the true boundary line, and that they
accordingly agrced that the Boundary Fencc would mark the boundary line. See
Response to Alleged Fact No.5, supra. This uncertainty regarding the precise location of
the boundary line is reinforced by the fact that the lmuses and Wymans did not obtain a
surveyor hire a professional to locate the true boundary line, a fact which the Bahrs
thcmsclves expressly admit.
Alleged Fact No.7: Thc dcposition tcstimony citcd in support ol'this alleged fact
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does not support the alleged fact. Rather, the Imuses and the Wymans have
unequivocally testified that although they used existing stakes and marking pins to
measure and estimate the location of the boundary line between their respective
properties, they were nevertheless uncertain of the precise location of the true boundary
line, and that they accordingly agreed that the Boundary Fence would mark the boundary
line. See Response to Alleged Fact No.5, supra. Indeed, Jim lmus noted that although
the parties ultimately reached an agreement as to the location of the fence, Brent Wyman
thought that he actually "got a little more than [he was] supposed to have." Jim lmus Dep.
36:5-10. (R. 711.) Given this, there can be no genuine dispute on this issue.
Alleged Fact No.8: 80th the lmuses and the Wymans have unequivocally
testified that although they used existing stakes and marking pins to measure and estimate
the location of the boundary line between their respective properties, they were
nevertheless uncertain of the precise location of the true boundary line, and that they
accordingly agreed that the Boundary Fence would mark the boundary line. See
Rcsponsc to i\llegcd I:act No.5. supra. This unccrlainty regarding the prccisc location
of the boundary line is reinforced by the fact that the Imuses and Wymans did not obtain
a surveyor hire a professional to locate the true boundary line, a fact which the Bahrs
themselves expressly admit. Accordingly, there can be no genuine dispute that the parties
were uncertain as to the precise location of the true boundary line and resolved the
uncertainty by agreeing to trcat the Boundary Fence as the true boundary.

Alleged Fact No. 12: Prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, the Plaintiffs never
mentioned any complaints or concerns regarding the location of the Boundary Fence.
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Melodee lmus Dep. at 64:9-17 CR. 685); Jim lmus Dep. at 46:5-15. CR. 714.) However,
even if Alleged Fact No. 12 is accepted as true, it is not material to Defendants' Motion
lor Summary Judgment and accordingly is admitted lor the limited purposes of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment only.
Moreover, notwithstanding the Bahrs' allegations regarding their alleged
statements about the location of the Boundary Fence, the Plaintiffs expressly admitted
during their depositions that they never took any action to prevent the lmuses from using,
improving. and occupying the Disputed Parcel. Sherri Bahr Dep. at 65 :7-12 CR. 760);
Robert Bahr Dep. at 26: 10-21. CR. 731.) Accordingly, there can be no genuine dispute
regarding Fact NO.8.
Alleged Faet No. 13: Prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, the Plaintiffs never

mentioned any complaints or concerns regarding the location ofthc Boundary Fence.
Melodee Imus Dep. at 64:9-17 CR. 685); .lim [mus Dep. at 46:5-1 5. CR. 714.) However,
even if Alleged Fact No. 13 is accepted as true, it is not material to Defendants' Motion
lor Summary Judgment and accordingly is admitted for the limited purposes of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment only.
Alleged Fact No. 19: The lmuses do not dispute this alleged fact, and have further

testified that if the Boundary Fence had been originally located I'urthcr to the cast. they
would have installed their landscaping further to the cast, and it would now be mature
and provide shading and privacy. Jim Imus Aff. at '120. CR. 252.)
Alleged Fact No. 20: The lmuses have unequivocally testified that they have

made significant permanent improvements to the Disputed Parcel including the Boundary
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Fence, irrigation systems extensive landscaping, and placement of sheds. Melodee Imus
Arf. at

~

8 (R. 229); Jim Imus Aff. at

~

8 (R. 250); Brenda Wyman Aff. at "7 (R. 864);

Brent Wyman Aff. at '17. (R. 869.) Photographs of the Imuses' landscaping as it has
matured over they years are attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavits of .I im and Melodee
lmus. Exhibit C to the Affidavits of .lim and Melodee lmus. (R.261-265; 242-246.) The
Imuses have also testified that the estimated original cost of the landscaping in the
Disputed Parcel is between $7000 and $9000, and that the replacement cost for those
improvements, with the mature growth. is in excess of$15,000. Melodee Imus AfT. at '19
(R. 229-230(; .lim Imus Aff. at '19 (R. 250-251); Second Mclodie Imus AfT. at '14. (R.
890.)

The [muses havc also produccd numerous receipts rcgarding impl'Ovements madc

to the Disputed Parcel, including receipts for materials to build the Boundary Fence and
landscaping. See documents attached as Exhibit "H" to Defendants' Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 991-1019); Melodie
Imus Dep. at 115: I0 (R. 698); Jim lmus Dep. at 71 :22-23 (R.720); Second Melodie Imus
Arf. at '14. (R. 890.)
Alleged Fact No. 21: This Alleged Fact contains or calls for a legal conclusion
that is not appropriately either admitted or denied. Moreover, the Bahrs were on actual
and constructive notice that the lmuses had a claim to the Disputed Parcel, as the
Boundary Fence and the [mus' landscaping was in place at the time Plaintiffs obtained
their pl'Operty, and the Plaintiffs were wcll aware of it. Melodec

[IllUS

Dcp. at 35:15-23

(R. 678); Jim lmus Dep. at 32:10-16 (R. 710); Sherri Bahr Dep. at 115:22-23. (R. 773.)
Accordingly, there can be no genuine dispute regarding Alleged Fact No. 21.
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Alleged Fact No. 22: It is undisputed that at all times following the Balm'
purchase of the 2074 E. Buckingham Way property, the Imuses and the Bahrs each
occupied, maintained, and improved their respective properties up to, but not over, the
Boundary Fence. Melodee fmus AIT. at'l 13 (R.230); Jim Imus AfC at "13. (R. 251.)
The Bahrs also admit that prior to the initiation of this action in March of 2004, thcy
never took any action to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, or occupying the
property east of the Boundary Fence, despite the fact that they were aware that the [muses
had installed landscaping and irrigation systems in the Disputed Parcel, and continued to
install additional landscaping alter the Bahrs moved in. Sherri Bahr Oep. at 65:7-12,
87:2-11; 114: 12-115: 11 (R.760, 766, 773) ; Robert Bahr Oep. at 26: 10-2 [; 50:24-5 [: 12.
(R. 731, 737.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly granted the Imuses' motion for summary judgment bascd
upon the doctrine of boundary by equitable estoppel. The [muscs have met each orthe
clcments of boundary by cquitablc estoppel, which are: I) action or a failure to act that is
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; 2) reasonable action taken on the basis of the
action or failure to act; and 3) a showing that injury would result from allowing
repudiation of such action or failure to act. Dahllnv. Co. v. Hughes, 2004 DT App 391,

'1

14,101 P.3d 83.
The undisputed evidence demonstrates that the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, the
Wymans, represented to the Imuses that if they would construct the Boundary Fence, the
Wymans would treat it as the true boundary line. It is undisputed that based upon these
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rcprcscntations, the Imuses built the Boundary Fence, installed irrigation and landscaping,
and located their east boundary fence. It is further undisputed that the Bahrs at all times
treated the Boundary Fence as the true boundary between the parties after they obtained
the property from the Wymans' successor in interest in approximately 1983, and for
nearly 15 years thereafter neither took any action to prevent the [muses from continuing
to occupy and improve the Disputed Parcel, or to even determinc whether the Boundary
Fencc marked the true boundary.
Finally, it is undisputed that if the Boundary Fence were now moved, the Imuses
would lose virtually all of the mature landscaping on the west side ofthcir property, an
injury which cannot be mitigatcd at any reasonable cost. The [muses would also be
compelled to move irrigation lines and tear down sheds built on thc wcst side of their
property. It is also undisputed that the Imuses would also lose a portion of their property
on their east boundary, as they likely cannot recover that property due to the long passage
of time.
Given this, the trial court propcrly held that the Imuses had satisfied the elements
of equitable estoppel. Because the trial court's ruling on the issue of equitable estoppel
involves application of the law to the undisputed facts, it is entitled to deference on
appeal, and should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. However, even if the
trial court's ruling were not entitled to deference, the undisputed evidence
overwhelmingly demonstrates that the 1muses are entitled to summary judgment based
upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed.
Accordingly, the Bahrs' arguments in support of their appeal must be rejectcd. As
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the Utah Supreme Court made clear in DahlInv. Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, '114,
101 P.3d 83 and Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997), equitable estoppel does not
require "fraud or misrepresentation" on the part of the party to be estopped. Ncithcr did
thc Bahrs nor their predecessors in interest need to have "actual knowledge" of the truc
boundary line in order to justify estoppel. Rather, their representations and their actions
in light of their knowledge that they were not sure of the true boundary line are sufficient
to justify the application of estoppel. Likewise, the affirmative representations, actions,
and inaction of the Wymans and the Bahrs are sufficient to support a claim for estoppel,
and the Imuses reliance on this behavior was substantial and patently reasonable. Givcn
all of this, the trial court's ruling and rcliance on Dahl was entirely appropriate.
The trial court's ruling can further be affirmed based on the doctrine of boundary
by agrcement, which provides that when the location of thc true boundary line bctwccn
two adjoining tracts of land is unknown. unccrtain or in disputc. thc owncrs thcrcot' may.
by parol agreement, establish the boundary line and thercby irrevocably bind themselvcs
and their grantees." Hummel v. Young, 265 P.2d 410, 411 (Utah 1953). The undisputed
facts demonstrate that the Imuses and the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, the Wymans,
established just such a "boundary by agreement," which is binding upon the Bahrs.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE BAHRS SHOULD BE
ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT THE BOUNDARY FENCE DOES
NOT MARK THE TRUE BOUNDARY
A.

The Imuses Have Met All ofthe Elements of Boundary by Estoppel

While the doctrines most commonly employed to resolve boundary disputes in
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Utah are the doctrines of Boundary by Acquiescence and Boundary by Agreement, the
Utah Supreme Court has expressly recognized a third doctrine devcloped to resolvc
boundary disputes: Boundary by Estoppel. As articulated by the Utah Supreme Court,
this theory "requires the combination of acts or representations by the original landowner
and reliance by a neighbor on those representations in order to establish a boundary."
SlakeI'. 785 P.2d 417 at 423 n. 4. Alternatively statcd. the elemcnts of an equitablc

cstoppcl claim establishing a boundary arc I) action or a failurc to act that is inconsistcnt
with a claim later asserted; 2) reasonable action taken on the basis of the action or failure
to act; and 3) a showing that injury would result from allowing repudiation of such action
or failure to acl. Dahl Inv. Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, "1114,101 P.3d 83.
Applying this legal standard to the undisputed facts, the trial court held as follows:
The Court finds that the [Imuses] have satisfied the elements of boundary
by estoppel and so are entitled to ownership of the disputed property. In
the present case, the undisputed evidence shows that the original
landowners, the Wymans and the Imuses, represented to one another that
the boundary they established was the property line between their
respective lots. In reliance on those mutual representations, the Imuses
built the fence as property line marker and then installed improvements on
thc property such as a shcd. koi pond. and landscaping up to thc fencc line.
Thc Wymans ncver objectcd to the [muscs or raiscd any complaint. Aftcr
the [Bahrs] acquircd thc propcrty formerly owned by thc Wymans, at Icast
lor a time, they did nothing to prevent the [lmuses] from maintaining and
adding further improvements, such as vegetation and fixturcs to the
property at issue.
Memorandum Decision, R. 1189-1190. Based on this, the trial court further held:
[V]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the [Bahrs], the
[l3ahrs] may have been legally entitled to have the plat map boundary
cstablished as the legal boundary but that their actions (and the actions of
thcir prcdecessors) estop them Irom asserting their legal rights.
Specifically, the Court finds that the [lmuses] reasonably relied on thc
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boundary established by the original owners, the Wymans, and not disputed
for many years by the [Bahrs]. Additionally, the Court finds that the
[Imuses] would be injured if[the Bahrs] were allowed to take possession of
the disputed portion of the property. It would be inequitable to now allow
[the Bahrs] to assert that the fence line is not the true boundary between the
properties and the [the Bahrs] are now estopped from doing so.

Id. at 1190-1191.
The trial court's application of the undisputed facts to the law of equitable estoppel
is entitled to deference on appeal. Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 678,680; Dahl, 2004 UT App
391,

'1"

8, 14. See Standard of Revicw, supra, at 1-5. Accordingly. in to ovcrturn thc

dccision of the trial court, thc Bahrs bear the burden of establishing that the trial court
"abused its discretion" in determining that equitable estoppel was proper in this case. lei.
The Bahrs cannot carry this burden.
The Wymans testified that they represented to the Imuses that if they would build
the Boundary Fence, thcy would treat it as the boundary between the parties' respective
properties. Brenda Wyman Aft'. at " 5 (R. 968); Brent Wyman i\fC at'l 5. (R.971.)
Based upon these representations, the Imuses incurred significant expense in constructing
the Boundary Fence. Further, at all times following the construction of the Boundary
Fence, the 1m uses and the Wymans both recognized the fence as a boundary, and
occupicd. improved. and enjoyed thcir respcctivc properties up

\0,

but not over, thc

Boundary Fence. 12 Over \he ensuing years the Imuses installed landscaping, an irrigation
system, and other improvements, including storage sheds near the fence. I) The 1muses
have spent literally hundreds of hours over the years planting thousands of plants

12

Statcment of Facts. supra, at ~ 6.
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including annuals, perennials, trees, and shrubs, and even installed an in-ground koi pond,
all in an effort to create a natural, secluded backyard environment. 14 These efforts have
come not only with a personal cost, but a financial cost in excess of $30,000.00. ld.
[n addition, based upon the representations of the Wymans, the lmuses located
their east boundary fence approximately 5 feet further to the west than they otherwise
would have, and have now arguably acquiesced in the east fence as a boundary. Mclodee
lmus Aff. at '123 (R. 231); Jim lmus Aff. at '123. (R. 252.

15

Accordingly, if the west

boundary is now moved 5 feet to the east as the Bahrs request, the lmuses' will have lost
approximately 5 feet of their property which they may not now recover. Such an
inequitable result should not be permitted.
Although the conduct of the Bahrs' predecessors in intercst is enough, on its own,
to justify estoppel in this case, the Bahrs' own conduct also militates against moving the
boundary line. The Bahrs openly admit that when they purchased their property, they did
so with full knowledge of the Boundary Fence and did not "suspect or believe" they were
purchasing the disputed parcel. Robert Bahr Dep. at 32:23-33: 8. (R. 732.) Rather, they
believed they were purchasing only the property to the west of the Boundary Fence, and
did not believe the legal description contained in the deed to the Bahr Property was at

Statement of Facts, supra, at ~'15, 7.
Statement of Undisputed Facts, supra, at ~ 8.
15 lfthe Plaintiffs' are correct in their assertions regarding the true location of the
boundary line between their property and that of the Defendants, the Defendants' eastern
boundary fence is also improperly located by a distance corresponding to the size of the
Disputed Parcel. j lowcver. due to the long passage of time and the circumstances
surrounding the construction of the eastern boundary fence, the [muses have likely lost
the ability to recover this property. Such a result is plainly inequitable.
13

14
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variance with the Boundary Fence. Id. at 74:9-22. (R. 743.) The Bahrs even admit that if
title to the Disputed Parcel is quieted in them, they would be getting more than they
thought they were getting at the time they purchased the Bahr Property. Robert Bahr Dep.
at 33:9-13. (R.752.)
Further, although the Bahrs now claim that they "questioned' during their
ownership of the property whether the fence marked the true boundary (a claim the
[muses vigorously deny but treated as true only for the limited purposes of their summary
judgment motion), they admit that prior to the initiation of this litigation in March of
2004, they never took any action to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, or
occupying the disputed parcel. 16 The Bahrs have also expreSSly admitted that prior to the
dispute over the Russian Olive Tree in approximately September of 2003, they took no
action (such as obtaining a surveyor even measuring their property) to determine whether
thc Roundary Fence actually marked the property linc.

IJ

Given the undisputed actions of the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, the Wymans,
as wcll as thc undisputcd conduct of the Bahrs, it would be inequitable to now move thc
boundary as the Bahrs request. Moving the boundary at this stage would not only require

Sherri Bahr Dep. at 65 :7-12 (R. 760); Robert Bahr Dep. at 26: 10-21. (R. 731.)
17 Complaint at ~128 (R. 4); Sherri Bahr Dep. at 45:16-46:1. (R.755-756.) On summary
judgment, the Bahrs contended that they did "take action" to prevent the lmuses from
using, occupying, or improving the Disputed Parcel, in that they complained to Sandy
City and obtained a survey. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment at 3-4. (R. 650-651.) However, these alleged actions did not occur
until approximately a year prior to the initiation of this action in March of2004, or nearly
15 years after the Bahrs acquired their property.
16
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thc Imuscs to incur significant expense. but would also cause them significant
inconvenience, as irrigation systems would have to be relocated, their storage shed would
have to be removed altogether, and they would lose virtually all of the irreplaceable
mature landscaping on the west side of their property.!8

Removal of the west side

landscaping would eliminate the lmuses' privacy and shade, and destroy the fruits of the
Imuses' many years of hard work and long hours devoted to beautifying and improving
thcir landscape. Mclodce lmus Aft'. at '122 (R. 231); Jim Imus Aff. at '122. (R. 252.)
Such loss would be virtually impossible to mitigate at any reasonable cost, as the mature
growth on the west side of the Imuses property has taken over 20 years to plant, grow,
and develop through constant tending. Id. Finally, the lmuses would also lose
approximatcly 5 fecI ol"their propcrty. which thcy likcly could not rccovcry from their
east neighbor after the long passage of timc.
These undisputed facts demonstrate that the equities in this case plainly weigh
heavily in favor of leaving the Boundary Fence in place, and that the Imuses have met all
of the elements of boundary by estoppel. Given this, thc trial court certainly did not abusc
its discretion in holding that the 13ahrs should be estopped from now claiming title to the
Disputcd Parccl, and its ruling should be affirmed.

B.

The Bahrs' New Arguments On Appeal Are Without Merit

On appeal, the Bahrs contend that the trial court improperly granted the 1muses
summary judgment because there are additional "elements" to a Boundary by Estoppel
claim that the Imuses have not satisfied or which present disputed issues of fact.
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Melodee Imus Aff. at '121 (R. 231); Jim Imus Aff. at '121. (R. 252.)
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However, as discussed more fully below, the Bahrs' new arguments either misstate or
misapprehend the law, and should be rejected.
1.

The Representations of the Bahrs and Wymans are
Sufficient to Support Estoppel.

The Bahrs assert that estoppel is improperly applied in this casc because there has
been no "fraud or misrepresentation of fact" by either the Bahrs or the Wymans. However,
even a cursory examination of Utah case laws reveals that no such showing is required to
support a claim for Boundary by Estoppel.
The court's decision in Dahl Investment Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, '114,
101 P.3d 830, is directly on poin!. In Dahl, the defendant poured a cement driveway
along a line the defendant believed marked the boundary betwecn the defendant and the
plaintiffs property. Plaintiffthereafler brought an action to quict title to the property,
asserting that the driveway actually encroached on propcrty to which he was legally
entitled.1d The defendant invoked the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The court held that
thc elcmcnts of equitable estoppel were as follows: I) action or a failure to act that is
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; 2) reasonable action taken on the basis of the
action or failure to act; and 3) a showing that injury would result from allowing
repudiation of such action or failure to act. Id. Despite the fact that there was no "fraud
or misrepresentation" on the part of the plaintiff, the court held the plaintiffwas
"estopped from asserting a claim to the property" because plaintiff had "failed to notify
!,defendant] of its claim" before the driveway had been pourcd and that "requiring
[defendant] to abandon or remove the driveway would constitute an injury." Jd. at
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~15.

Likewise, in Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997) the

plaintift~

after

initially representing to the defendant that she did not want and would not accept child
support, later sought to recover reimbursement equivalent to five years of back chi Id
support payments from the defendant. Id. at 678. The defendant raised equitable
cstoppcl. explaining that based upon the plaintiffs representations that she did not want
child support, he had married and started a

t~lmily,

and was accordingly not financially

capablc of paying the back child support payments in addition to the current child support
payments.Id. at 681. Applying the same three elements of equitable estoppel as the court
in Dahl, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had correctly held that the
defendant had "reasonably changed his position in reliance on [the plaintiffs]
rcprcscntations" that she did not want him to pay child support, and that the plainti ff
should be estopped from now taking a position "inconsistent with" her earlier
representations. Id.
The foregoing authority makes it plain that no affirmative "fraud or
misrcpresentation" is required to apply estoppel. Rather, as in Dahl, inaction on its own
can form the basis of estoppel. Similarly, as inlrizarry, a party who makes
representations of future intent upon which another party reasonably relies can be
estopped from later changing her mind and contradicting those representations when there
has been detrimental reliance.
In this case, not only did the Wymans fail to stop the Imuses fi·om constructing the
Boundary Fence, locating their eastern boundary fence, and installing improvements
along the fence, the Wymans affirmatively represented prior to the construction of the
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fence and improvements that they would agree to treat the Boundary Fence as the actual
boundary line. These facts are not disputed by the Bahrs, nor can they be. The Wymans
have even testified that they believe that based upon their representations to the Imuses
regarding the Boundary Fence, it would be inequitable to now quiet title to the Disputed
Parcel in the Bahrs, or require removal of the Boundary Fence. 19
Further, to the extent that the action of the Bahrs is relevant, thcir conduct also
supports application of estoppel. While the Bahrs have testified that they suspected or
believed that the Boundary Fence did not mark the true boundary, apart from allegedly
cxprcssing this suspicion to thc Imuscs. thcy ncvcr took any action to dctcrminc whether
that was the case, or to prcvent the lmuses from using, improving, or occupying the
property east of the Boundary Fence 20 Given these undisputed facts, the Imuses have
plainly satisfied the elements of boundary by estoppel.

2.

21

The Parties Had Sufficient Knowledge to Support Estoppel

The Bahrs next contend that equitable estoppel is improper because the Bahrs "did
not have actual knowledge of the true boundary line," and therefore did not act "with

Brenda Wyman Aff. at ~ 8 (R. 218); Brent Wyman AfT at ~ 8. (R. 223.)
20 Sherri Bahr Dep. at 65 :7-12 (R. 760); Robert Bahr Dep. at 26: 10-21. (R. 731.)
21 The cases cited by the Bahrs in support of their arguments do not alter this analysis.
I:or example. Youngblood v. AUlo-Owners Ins. Co.. 2007 UT 28. '1" 14,15. 158 P.3d 1088.
recognized the same elements of equitable estoppel identified by the court in Dahl, and
involved a very specific application ofthcse elcments as wcll as the elemcnts of
promissory estoppel in the narrow context of modification of the written terms of an
insurance policy. Id. Likewise, in Morgan v. Board a/State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697
(Utah 1976) the court noted that while "the measure we apply to plaintiffs elaims of
estoppel is an adaptation to this ease of the standard heretofore approved by this court,"
the standard adopted by the court and cited by the Bahrs is not materially different from
that set forth in Dahl and numerous other Utah cases.
19
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actual knowledge of the relevant facts" in failing to object to the lmuses' use and
improvement of the Disputed Parcel. This argument suffers from multiple flaws.
First , the Bahrs fail to recoonize
the undisputed knowledGe
to
to and affirmative action
of the Wymans that lies at the heart of the Imuses equitable estoppel claim. There is no
dispute that the Wymans were aware that they did not know the precise location of the
actual boundary, and that they were well aware that the agreed line may not conform
precisely with the actual boundary. However, despite the parties' uncertainty regarding
the precise location ol'the true boundary line, the Wymans represented that they would
treat the line now marked by the Boundary Fence as the true boundary line if the Imuses
constructed the Boundary Fence.

It is undisputed that the Wymans knew that based upon this representation, the
Imuses would expend funds and labor to build the Houndary Fencc. They also kncw that
the [muses agreed with their neighbor to the east to build an eastern boundary fence in a
location that was based upon the Wymans' representations regarding the western
Boundary Fence, giving up property that likely cannot now be recovered. After the
Boundary Fence was constructed, the Wymans also were aware that based upon their
representations, the lll1uses expended I'unds and many, many hours improving the
Disputed Parcel.
The trial court held that these representations and subsequent reliance by the
Imuses justified the application of equitable estoppel. This ruling is consistent with the
undisputed I'acts and the legal standard for equitable estoppel set I'orth in Dahl. Irizarrv.
and numerous other Utah cases. The Hahrs have not produced any evidence that this
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determination amounts to an abuse of discretion, and the trial court's ruling should
accordingly be affirmed.
Second, to the extent that the action of the Bahrs is relevant, they certainly acted
with sufficient knowledge to justifY the application of estoppel against them. At the time
the Bahrs purchased their property they were aware of the existence and location 01' thc
Boundary Fence, that the Imuses occupied and claimed the property up to the Boundary
Fence, that the Imuses maintained the property up to the Boundary Fence, that the Imuses
planted vegetation and trees up to the Boundary Fence, and that the Imuses had installed
irrigation systems up to the Boundary Fence 22 The Bahrs have further testified that while
they suspected or believed that the Boundary Fence did not mark the true boundary, apart
from allegedly expressing this suspicion to the Imuses, they never took any action

\0

determine whether that was the case, or to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, or
occupying the property east of the Boundary Fence.

23

In short, although the undisputed conduct of the Wymans is alone enough to justily
the application 01' estoppcl in this case. the undisputed conduct and knowledge ol'the
Bahrs only further supports the trial court's determination that equitable estoppel is
proper.

Sherri Bahr Dep. at 65 :7-12, 87:2-11; 114: 12-115: 11 (R. 760, 766, 773); Robert Bahr
Dep. at 26:10-21; 50:24-51:12. (R. 731, 737.)
23 Sherri Bahr Dep. at 65 :7-12 (R. 760): Robert Bahr Dep. at 26: 10-21 (R. 731). On
summary judgment, the Bahrs contended that they did "take action" to prevent the Imuses
from using, occupying, or improving the Disputed Parcel, in that they complained to
Sandy City and obtained a survey. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment at 3-4. (R. 650-651.) However, these alleged actions did not
occur until approximately a year prior to the initiation of this action in March 01'2004, or

22
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3.

The Affirmative Representations of the Wymans Support
Estoppel

According to the Bahrs, estoppel cannot be applied in this case because the Bahrs
never made any affirmative representations to the Imuses, but instead were, at worst,
merely "silent," and "mere silence or inaction" is not a ground for estoppel "unless there
is a duty to speak or act." The Bahrs further contend that in any event, they were not
"silent," in that they allege they expressed to the Imuses their suspicion that the Boundary
Fence did not mark the true boundary.
As a threshold malter, the Bahrs argument fails because it ignores that it is
primarily the undisputed actions of the Wymans, not the Bahrs, the forms the basis of the
Imuses estoppel claim. As discussed atleng1h supra, the Bahrs predecessors in interest,
the Wymans, were not merely silent, but affirmatively represented to the Imuses that they
would agree to treat the fence as the boundary if the Imuses would build the fence. These
actions are binding on the Bahrs as the Wymans successors in interest, and on their own
support the application of estoppel in this case.
Further, Utah courts have expressly held that "silence" or "inaction" can form the
basis of a claim for boundary by estoppel. As discussed supra, in Dahl the court held that
wherc the plaintilTfailed to object to the dclcndanls' pouring ofa driveway that the
plaintilTbelieved encroached on his property. he was thereafter estopped from asscrting
his claim. Dahl, 2004 UT App. 391 at

15. As the Dahl court plainly stated, estoppel is

nearly 15 years after the Bahrs acquired their property.
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appropriate where there is "action or failure to act" upon which another party reasonably
relies to his detriment. Id.
As also discussed at length supra, the Bahrs' inaction supports estoppel. The
Bahrs have testified that while they suspected or believed that the Boundary Fence did not
mark the true boundary, apart from allegedly expressing this suspicion to the Imuscs, for
nearly fifteen years they did not assert any claim to the Disputed Parcel, nor did they take
any action to determine whether the Boundary Fence was mis-located, or take any action
to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, or occupying the property east of the
Boundary Fcncc. Undcr Dahl and othcr Utah authority, such inaction can plainly support
an equitable estoppel claim.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that
the [muses' reliance on the Wymans representations regarding the boundary fence
justilies estoppel.
4.

The Imuses Reasonably Relied on the Wymans' Representations

The Bahrs next contend that the trial court erred in applying equitable estoppel
because I) the Imuses were not "hapless victims who were deluded by the malfeasance of
another party" into building the boundary fence; and 2) the Imuses improperly relicd on
the representations of the Wymans that they would treat the Boundary Fence as the
boundary line. Neither ofthcse contentions is entitled to scrious consideration.
i\s discussed supra. Utah law is clear that in ordcr to support a claim for estoppel.
a party need not demonstrate that there has been a "fraud or misrepresentation of fact,"
but rather only that a party's "action or failure to act" which induces detrimental reliance
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is "inconsistent with a claim later asserted." As the court made clear in Dahl and Irizarry,
where a party fails to act or makes representations that induce detrimental reliance,
estoppel is proper. Given this, the Bahrs' assertion that something akin to fraud is
required to support a claim for estoppel is simply contraly to Utah law.
Further, although their argument is somewhat confusing, the Bahrs apparently
contend that the lmuses could not have reasonably relied upon representations of the
Wymans regarding the Boundary fence because the Imuses could have resolved any
uncertainty regarding the actual location of the boundary line by obtaining a survey. This
argument demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the 1muses' equitable estoppel
claim.
The [muses do not contend that the Wymans represented that they knew the true
location of the boundary line, and that the lmuses relied on this representation in building
the Boundary fence and using the Disputed Parcel. Rather, the representation by the
Wymans upon which the 1muses relied was the representation that despite the parties'
uncertainty regarding the precise location of the true boundary line, the Wymans would
treat the line now marked by the Boundary Fence as the true boundary line if the lmuses
constructed the Boundary Fence.
Based upon this representation, the 1muses expended funds and labor to build the
Boundary Fence, located their eastern boundary, spent thousands of dollars and many,
many hours improving the Disputed Parcel, and also placed sheds in the Disputed Parcel
which would now have to be destroyed if the Boundary Fence is moved as the Bahrs
Request.
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Based on these facts, the case cited by the Bahrs in support of their argument,

Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1985), is inapposite. In Barnard the court
refused to enforce an oral land sales contract between a mother and son because the legal
description of the land to be conveyed was "too indefinite to permit specific
enforcement." Jd. at 1115. The court further rejected the son's claim that his mother
should be estopped from claiming a deficiency in the description, finding that "[t]here is
nothing in the record even implying that [defendant] knew the contract was unenforceable
because ofa deficiency in the description of the land" and that she therefore could not
have made any misl'epresenlation regarding the propriety of the description upon which
the son relied. Id at 1115-1116. In addition, since the son received a refund of his
money, he was not damaged and did not demonstrate any detrimental reliance. fd. at
1116.
This case is distinctly different from Barnard. Whereas in Barnard the defendant
did not make any affirmative representation upon which the plaintilTrelicd, in this case
the Wymans represented that they would treat the Boundary Fence as the true boundary
line. Unlike Barnard, where the plaintiff claimed he relied upon the defendant's implied
assertions regarding the legal sufficiency of the terms of the oral contract, the Imuses do
not contend that the Wymans made any representation regarding the location of the true
boundary line. Rather, the representation the Imuses relied on was the representation that
if the Imuses built the fence in the agreed location, the Wymans would treat it as the true
boundary line. Finally, whereas in Barnard the plainti ff did not demonstrate any damages
or detrimental reliance, the Imuses expended the costs for the fence, installed their
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landscaping, irrigation, and sheds and located their eastern boundary fence based upon the
Wymans representation that they would treat the western Boundary Fence as the true
boundary linc.
[n short, the trial court was well within the law in holding that the [muses
reasonably relied upon the representations of the Wymans in building the Boundary
Fence, improving and using the Disputed Parcel, and locating their eastern boundary
fence. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and its ruling should be
affirmed.
5.

Moving the Boundary Would Cause Significant Injury

The Bahrs contend that the trial court improperly applied equitable estoppel in this
case because equitable estoppel requires a showing that "permanent improvements" were
madc. and the Imuses did not makc such "pcrmancnt improvcmcnts" in the Disputed
Parcel. This argument misstates both the facts and the law.
Equitable estoppel in Utah requires only that "injury" result if the estopped party
repudiates its act or failure to act. See Dahl Inv. Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, '114,
101 P.3d 83. To the extent the [muses' injury in this case is manifested through the
making of improvements. the improvements they installed on the disputed parcel are
permanent and substantial. Based upon the actions of the Wymans and the Bahrs, the
[muses installed a fence, landscaping, irrigation systems, and storage sheds. These
improvements are certainly as permanent and substantial as the driveway at issue in Dahl,
and removing them would cause injury to the [muses. See Hogan v. Swayze, 237 P. 1097,
1101 (Utah 1925) ("It must be conceded that any permanent improvements, such as
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buildings [and] fences ... will enhance ... the value of adjacent land."). See also

Adamson Cos. v. City ofMalibu, 854 F.Supp. 1476, 1481 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (referring to
landscaping as a "permanent" improvement); In re Greenland Homes, Inc., 227 B.R. 710,
716 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1998) (referring to landscaping as a "permanent improvement");

Grant v. Hipsher. 64 Cal.Rptr. 892, 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (referring to a fence as a
"pcrmancnt" improvcmcnt): Williams v. Rogier. 611 N.E.2d 189, 195 (Ind. Ct. App.
1993) (rcfcrring to a bordcr fcnce as a "permancnt" improvement), overruled on olher

grounds; Babin

v.

Babin, 433 So.2d 225, 226 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (referring to a fence as

a "permanent" improvement); In re Babb, 567 P.2d 599, 584 (Or. Ct. App. 1977)
(indicating that a fence is a "substantial" improvement); Ex parle Askins, 356 S.E.2d 838,
838 (S.C. 1987) (indicating that a fence is part of a ·'permanent'· improvement)24
Further, even if the improvements installed by the Imuses were not "permanent,"
as the Bahrs attempt to define that term, estoppel would still be proper because making
improvements is only one way in which detrimental reliance and injury can be
establishcd. Indeed. thc Utah Supreme Court has held that. "it is a rule almost of
universal application that one who stands by and sees another purchase land or cntcr upon

These cases demonstrate that many different courts, in many different contexts, view
the types of improvements made by appellees as permanent and substantial. The cases
cited by appellants, on the other hand, focus on improvements that are easily moved (a
small ditch in Downing v. Boehringer, 349 P.2d 306 (Idaho 1960); bricks set in sand in
Marhenholz v. AljJ, 112 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1962); and a mobile home in Gorbics v.
Close, 722 S. W.2d 672, 675 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986» or on improvements that were not
even on the disputed property (as in Evans v. Forte, 510 So.2d 327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987» or for which no evidence of cost or effort existed (as in Dart v. Thompson, 154
N. W.2d 82 (Iowa 1967».

24
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it under a claim of right and permits such other to make expenditures or improvements
under circumstances which would call for notice or protest cannot afterward assert his
own title against such person." Migliaccio v. Davis, 232 P.2d 195,200 (Utah 1951)
(emphasis added). Under this authority, the expenditures of the Imuses on the Boundary
Fence and the irrigation system and landscaping in the Disputed Parcel are sufficient to
support estoppel.
Moreover, other "injury" sustained by the Imuses, including the loss of property,
shading, and privacy, also supports equitable estoppel. Indeed, while the Bahrs cite

Pelerson v. Johnson, 34 P.2d 697 (Utah 1934), to attempt to narrow the type of
cognizable injury, Utah case law (including Dahl) indicates otherwise. Although

Pelerson does use the phrase "permanent improvements" in dicta, it does so based on the
earlier case of Tripp v. Bagley, 276 P. 912, 918 (Utah 1929), which discusses
improvements in the context of whether or not the party claiming estoppel would incur
any injury. Accordingly, the test is not whether the Imuses affixed a specific type of
'"permanent" improvement on the disputed parcel - it is whether or not the lmuses would
bc injured ifthcy had to movc thcir fence and improvements. See id. at918.
The undisputed cvidcncc shows that the Imuses would be so injured. Based upon
the representations of the Wymans, the 1muses located their eastern boundary fencc
approximately five feet farther to the west than they otherwise would have and have now
arguably acquiesced in the eastern fence as a boundary. Accordingly, if the western
boundary is now moved five fect to the east as the Bahrs request, the Imuses will lose
approximately five feet of their property that they may not ever recover. In addition, the
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Imuses installed their west side landscaping in the Disputed Parcel based upon the
location of the Boundary Fence, and would now lose all of this irreplaceable, mature,
twenty-year-old landscaping if the boundary is moved as the Bahrs request. As such, the
Imuses would be severely injured if the boundary is now moved, and equitable estoppel is
proper in this case.
C.

The Trial Court Properly Relied on the Court's Decision in Dah'

Essentially repeating arguments they have already made elsewhere in their

briel~

the Bahrs assert that the trial court erred in relying on Dahl in applying equitable estoppel
in this case for the following reasons: I) the court's ruling in Dahl was rcached following
a trial and not on summary judgment; 2) unlike the estopped party in Dahl, the Imuses
wcre not uncertain of the true boundary line; and 3) the Imuses did not rely on
rcpresentations of the Bahrs in installing the Boundary Fence or improving the Disputed
Parcel. None of these alleged "distinctions" are significant or undermine the trial court's
ruling.

1.

The Trial Court's Ruling on Mixed Questions of Law and Fact is
Entitled to Deference and Should Not be Reversed Absent an
Abuse of Discretion

The Bahrs contend that unlike Dahl, the trial court's resolution of the mixed
question of law and fact presented by the Imuses equitable estoppel claim is not entitled
to deference on appeal because the trial court did not rely on live testimony in
dctcrmining thc opcrativc facts. Ilowcvcr. as discussed at length supra. Utah courts havc
speci fically held that such deference is proper regardless of whether the relevant facts
considered by the trial court in resolving mixed questions of law and fact were stipulated
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or presented through written motions, as opposed to live testimony at trial. See Standard
of Review, supra, at 2-5. Given this, the abuse of discretion standard set forth in Dahl
applies in this case.

2.

The Imuses Were Uncertain of the True Boundary

The Bahrs contend that Dahl is inapposite because the Tmuses were not "ignorant
or uncertain of the true boundary line" prior to the time they constructed the Boundary
Fence and other improvements as were the defendants in Dahl. This argument ignores
the extensive undisputed facts to the contrary, which indicate that the Imuses and 13ahrs
were, in fact, uncertain of the true boundary 25 Given this, Dahl is applicable.
This argument further ignores that unlike the defendant in Dahl, the lmuses did not
simply build the fence and rely on the silence of the Wymans in invoking estoppel.
Rathcr, the lmuses sharcd their uncertainty with the Wymans, who did not simply remain
silcnt, but affirmatively represented that they would trcat thc fencc as the boundary if the
Tmuses would build it. Such reliance is even more compelling that that at issuc in Dahl,
and the reasoning of Dahl accordingly militates strongly in favor of estoppel in this case.

3.

The Representations ofthe Wymans Justify Estoppel

The Bahrs finally assert that the trial court improperly relied on Dahl because
unlike the defendants in Dahl, the Bahrs did not own their property at the timc the Imuses
constructed the Boundary Fence and installed the improvements in the Disputed Parcel

See Melodee lmus Dep. at 55:11-19,57:10-58:13,60:8-12 (R. 683-684); Jim lmus
Dep. at 34:13 - 36:10,37:10-18 (R. 711-712); Brenda Wyman Aff. aqj5 (R. 218); Brent
Wyman AfT. at ~ 5. (R. 223.)
25
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and accordingly were not present to object to the fence. However, the actions of the
Wymans and the inaction of the Bahrs is sufficient to support estoppel.
As already discussed at length supra, it is undisputed that the Bahrs' predecessors
in interest, the Wymans, affirmatively represented to the Imuses that if they built the
Boundary Fence, the Wymans would treat it as the true boundary. It is further undisputed
that in reliance on these representations, the 1muses constructed the Boundary Fence,
located their eastern boundary, and installed improvements in the Disputed Parcel.
Accordingly, this case presents an even more compelling case of reliance than in Dahl,
where cstoppel was supported by mcre silence.
Moreover. thc Bahrs havc tcstified that whilc they suspected or believed that the
Boundary Fcnce did not mark the true boundary, apart from allegedly expressing this
suspicion to the Imuses, for at least 15 years they did not take any action

(0

determine

whether that was the case (such as obtaining a surveyor even measuring their property),
or to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, or occupying the property east of the
Boundary Fencc. Sherri Bahr Oep. at 65:7-12 (R. 760); Robert Bahr Ocp. at 26:10-21 (R.
731). Accordingly, to the extent the conduct of the Bahrs is relevant, their undisputed
behavior supports estoppel under the reasoning of Dahl.
D.

The Bahrs' New Argument of "Counter Estoppel" Should be Rejected

In what amounts to little more than recycling arguments already made elsewhere in
their brief to fit a new theory not presented to the trial court in opposing the Imuses'
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Bahrs contend that the 1muses should be "counterestopped" fi'olll invoking equitable estoppel. In support of this new legal theory, the
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Bahrs repeat their allegation that by relying on the representations of the Wymans in
building the Boundary Fence, the Imuses are the victims of "their own error" and it would
be incquitable for the 1muses to "now blame the Bahrs" for this error because the Balus
were not present when the Boundary Fence was buill.
As a threshold matter, this argument was not raised before the trial court and is
instead made for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, it should be rejected without
further consideration on this ground alone.
Moreover, the Bahrs' argumcnt fails on the merits. As discusscd atlcngth, supra,
the Bahrs cannot ignore the conduct of their predecessors in interest. While the Imuses
were admittedly uncertain of the precise location of the true boundary line, it is
undisputed that the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, the Wymans, were well aware of this
uncertainty and represented to thc Imuses that if they would construct thc Boundary
Fence, the Wymans would treat it as the true boundary. It is further undisputed that the
by the time the Bahrs obtained their property, significant detrimental reliance by the
Imuses had already occurred, in that they had already built the Boundary Fence, located
their east boundary, laid out their yard, and installed extensive improvements in the
Disputed Parcel. This undisputed action by the Bahrs' predecessors in interest is binding
on the l3ahrs and is, on its own, enough to justify the application of estoppel in this case
under Dahl and other Utah authority.
In addition, it is undisputed that despite their alleged suspicions regarding the
accuracy of the Boundary Fence, for at least fifteen years after acquiring the property, the
Bahrs did not themselves take any action (such as obtaining a surveyor even measuring
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their property) to determine whether the Boundary Fence was accurate, or to prevent the
[muses from using, improving, or occupying the property east of the Boundary Fence.
Given this, there is no basis for "counter estoppel," and the trial court did not abusc its
discretion in applying equitable estoppel in this case.
Finally, the Bahrs imply that they are somehow entitled to an estoppel because the
lmuses allegedly erroneously rcprescnted to them that the Boundary Fence marked the
proper boundary, and the Bahrs relied on this representation in not disputing the property
line. This argument is inherently flawed. The doctrine of equitable estoppel operates to
prevent a party from contradicting representations upon which another party relies to its
detriment. In this case, even if the Bahrs' assertions that the [muses previously
represented to them that the Boundary Fence was the proper boundary are accepted as
true, the lmuses are not now attempting to contradict this alleged representation by
asserting that the Boundary Fence is not the proper boundary. Accordingly, there is no
basis for "estopping" the [muses from continuing to claim that the Boundary Fenee
should be treated as the boundary.
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has held that an essential element of "counter
estoppel" is reasonable reliance on the estopped party's alleged action or inaction. Arnold

Industries, Inc. v. Love, 2002 UT 133, '120, 63 P.3d 721 ("counter estoppel" claim failed
because parties did not establish "reasonable reliance"). The Bahrs have repeatedly
alleged that they did not believe the lmuses' alleged representations that the Boundary
Fence marked the true boundary line. Robert Bahr Oep. 62:20-64:2 (R. 740); Sherri Bahr
Oep. 23: 14-22. (R. 750.) Indeed Robert Bahr specifically testified that he did not rely in
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any way on the Imuses' alleged representations regarding the property line and the
Boundary fence. Id. Given this. another critical element of counter estoppel is not met
and the Bahrs' counter estoppel claim must fail.

E.

The Bahrs Are Bound by the Conduct of Their Predecessors in Interest

The Bahrs claim that the Imuses' equitable estoppel claim cannot be sustained
because the actions of their predecessors in interest, the Wymans, are not binding upon
thcm. This argumcnt

1~lils

bccausc (]) it is contrary to Utah law: (2) it is contrary to thc

law in numerous othcrjurisdictions: and (3) thc Bahrs' own conduct supports estoppcl.
[n Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court stated
that the boundary by estoppel theory "requires the combination of acts or representation
by the original landowner and reliance by a neighbor on those representations." Id., 423
n.4 (emphasis added). Thc adjcctivc "original" necessarily implics that thcrc is a
subscqucnt landowner that is bound by the original - by its predecessor in interest.
Indeed, the word would have no meaning otherwise. As such, there is no need to examine
the foreign and secondary sources cited by the Bahrs - the Utah Supreme Court has
alrcady indicatcd that Utah subscribes to the rule that grantees are bound by an estoppel
that would havc bound a grantor (thc "Prcdccessor Rulc"). See Carter v. University

0/

Utah Med. Ctr., 2006 UT 78, '19, 150 P.3d 467 (stating in the similar context of statutory
construction that courts should avoid interpretations that will render words superfluous or
inoperative).
This authority is consistent with other Utah authority relating to the analogous
doctrines of boundary by acquiescence and boundary by agrcement. In both cascs. Utah
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courts have repeatedly held that the actions of a landowner's predecessors in interest are
binding upon successors, even where they had no knowledge of thcm. See RHN Corp. v.

Viebell, 2004 UT 60,

~30,

96 P.3d 935; Brown v. Milliner, 232 1'.2d 202, 206 (Utah

1951). It would make little sense for the Predecessor Rule to apply to these doctrines, but
not to the very similar and related doctrine of boundary by estoppel. Indeed, if the
position urged by the Bahrs were accepted, a party that would be otherwise estoppcd from
inllicting injury on an innocent party could circumvent estoppel merely by transferring its
dccd to another party.
Such a result is not only irrational, it would be particularly inequitable here, where
the Wymans made express representations to the Imuses, inducing their reliance, and the
Bahrs had clear and obvious notice ofthc situation before they purchased their property
li'om thc Wymans. Whilc thc Bahrs call thcmsclvcs --bona fide purchasers:' Utah law is
clcar that purchasers may only invoke bona fide purchaser status if they purchased the
subject property without notice of another party's claim and that "[s]uch notice may be
actual or constructive." Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App_ 278, ~ 24,989 P.2d 61. It is
also clear that "constructive notice may arise from a duty to inquire when one has 'the
knowledge of certain facts and circumstances. ", id. (quoting First Am. Title ins. Co. v.

JB. Ranch, 966 P.2d 834, 837-38 (Utah 1998».
The Wymans have admitted that notwithstanding their alleged belief that the
Boundary Fence was inaccurate, when they purchased their property, they did so with full
knowlcdge of the Boundary Fence. The Bahrs were further aware that the Imuses made
elaim to the property on their side of the Boundary Fence, and that the 1m uses occupied,
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maintained, irrigated, and improved the property on their side of the Boundary Fence.
Moreover, even the Bahrs own citations recognize that other jurisdictions "hold
that a person who derives title from or through another party is ordinarily bound by every
estoppel that would have bound the other party." 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver §
133 26 These authorities speci fically follow the same Predecessor Rule as Utah. See, e.g,

Holden v. Weidenfeller, 929 S.W.2d 124,131 (Tex. App. 1996) ("An easement by
estoppel, once created, is binding upon successors in title if reliance upon the existence of
the easement continues."); Greenan v. Solomon, 472 S.E.2d 54, 57 (Va. 1996) ("[T]hose
who derive title from or through the parties[] ordinarily stand in thc same position as the
partics. and are bound by every estoppel that would have been binding on the partics.")
(quotiations omitted). See also 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 65 (2008) ("The privies
of a grantor or grantee are estopped to the same extent as the original parties to the deed,
and may in like manner take advantage of the estoppel.").
Further, cvcn injurisdictions that do not follow the Predecessor Rule, the courts
will still apply estoppel if the subsequent purchaser had notice of the estoppel. See Evans

The other secondary authority cited by the Bahrs is 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver, § 8
(1996), which has now been replaced by a later version of the Corpus Juris Secundum
that does not support the proposition cited by the Bahrs. See 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and
Waiver, § 8. Further, even the language cited by the Bahrs specifically endorses estoppel
"as between the same parties or those in legal privity with them." Here, the Bahrs
purchased their property from the Wymans, receiving title by deed. This constitutes
privity. See, e.g, Myers v. Key Bank, N.A, 495 N.Y.S.2d 755, 757 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985) ("[P]etitioners, as grantees in privity with an estopped grantor, are also estopped
since they were not bona fide purchasers without knowledge ...."); Long v. Trantham,
39 S.E.2d 384, 387 ("The defendants ... having ... purchased the land of[grantors]
stand in privity of title to them and would likewise be estopped ....").
26
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v. WiltollJ 869 S.W.2d 872. 875 (Mo Ct. App. 1994) (finding no estoppel only if the
grantee had no notice). See also 28 AmJur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 133 (discussing a
·'bona fide purchaser without notice of an estoppel against his or her grantor"). Here, the
Bahrs had notice that the Imuses claimed the Disputed Parcel, as discussed supra.
Finally, the Bahrs' own conduct itself justifies application of boundary by
estoppel. Although the Bahrs now claim that they "questioned" whether the fence
marked the true boundary during their ownership of the property (a claim the Imuses
vigorously deny but treated as true for the limited purposes of summary judgment below),
they admitted that for nearly 15 years after acquiring their property, they never took any
action to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, and occupying the disputed parcel.
Additionally, the Bahrs admit that, prior to the dispute over the Russian Olive Tree in
approximately September 2003, they took no action to determine whether the fence
actually marked the property line. This conduct constitutes a failure to act that is
inconsistent with the Bahrs' current claims, which failure to act reasonably caused the
1muses to install significant improvements on the disputed parcel. Allowing the Bahrs to
repudiate their actions at this point would cause the 1muses significant injury, and the
Bahrs should be estopped from doing so.
Based on the foregoing, the Bahrs are properly estopped by their own conduct and
by that of their predecessors in interest.
II.

THE IMUSES ARE ENTITLED TO THE PROPERTY ON THEIR SIDE OF
THE BOUNDARY FENCE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY
AGREEMENT
While the trial court's ruling can and should be sustained based solely on the
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doctrine of boundary by estoppel, it can also be affirmed based upon the doctrine of
Boundary by Agreement. As the Utah Supreme Court has held, "it has long been
recognized" in Utah that "when the location of the true boundary line between two
adjoining tracts of land is unknown. uncertain or in dispute. the owners thereof may, by
parol agreement, establish the boundary line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves and
their grantees." Hummel v. Young, 265 P.2d 410, 411 (Utah 1953). The undisputed facts
demonstrate that the Imuses and the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, the Wymans,
established just such a "boundary by agreement," which is binding upon the Bahrs.
The Imuses purchased their residential property at 2084 E. Buckingham Drive in
Sandy, Utah in March of 1983. Shortly thereafter, in about June of that year, the [muses
approached the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, the Wymans, and asked whether they
were interested in constructing a fence marking the boundary between the two
properties 27 The Wymans indicated that although they could not afford to help pay for the
Boundary Fence. they would like to have the fence and would be willing to assist in the
location and construction of the fenee. 28 During this same period, the Imuses consulted
with their then-neighbor to the east, Mr. Dalton, who also agreed to aid in the
construction ofa boundary fence on the east side of the Imuses' property.29
The [muses thereafter purchased the materials to construct the fence. Because the
parties were uncertain of the precise location of the true boundary line. they mutually
agreed to a location for the boundary line and constructed the Boundary Fence along that

27
28

Statement of Facts, supra, at '12.
Statement of Facts, supra, at ~ 3.
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line. 30 Based upon the Wymans' representation that they agreed to this location of the
boundary line, the 1muses used the materials they had purchased and, with the Wymans'
help, constructed the Boundary Fence. Jd.
The agreed boundary line is binding on the Bahrs, as successors in interest to the
Bahrs. Hummel, 265 P.2d at 411. Based upon these undisputed facts. the Imuses have
satisfied the elements of their Boundary by Agreement claim, and are entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.
In opposing the Imuses' Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue, the Bahrs
asserted that application of Boundary by Agreement was improper in this case because,
inter alia, the lmuses and Wymans were not "uncertain" of the true boundary line and

there was no "long period of acquiescence" in the established boundary line therealter.
As set forth at length in the Imuses' Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment and
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Bahrs' arguments
are without merit and do not preclude summary judgment in favor of the Imuses based
upon the doctrine of Boundary By Agreement. Rather than fully repeat these arguments
here, the Imuses refer the Court to these memoranda 31
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Imuses respectfully request that the Bahrs' appeal be

Statement of Facts, supra, at 'iI 2.
30 Statement of Facts. supra, at '1'1 4-5.
31 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 457486.); Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
801-908)
29
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denied.
DATED

.~

thl~th

day of August. 2008.
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